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PARTITION OF THE GERMAN TOGO COLONY:
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES1
Between the late 1940s and 1960, the so-called "Togoland or Ewe-question" became the first
postwar international attempt to determine whether or not the borders drawn by the
colonizing powers in Africa should be maintained or changed. In 1884 Togo became a
Gennan colony, and southern Togo, populated predominantly by the Ewes, became in-
corporated into the global market as a producer of agricultural commodities. After
Gennany's defeat in World War I, the League of Nations divided Togo into a British and a
French Mandated Sphere. The western British part became integrated into the neighbouring
Gold Coast Colony, whereas the French administered the eastern part as a separate Mandate.
During World War II, a strong indigenous reunification movement emerged. At first, it only
desired to reunite all Ewes, but later it aimed at reunification of both Togos. The United
Nations General Assembly and Trusteeship Council discussed the political future of the for-
mer German colony. A 1956 plebiscite supervised by the United Nations rejected reunifica-
tion. British Togo became part of Ghana in 1957, whereas French Togo emerged as the
Repubüc of Togo in 1960. This essay investigates how the Ewes became fragmented after the
partition of the German Togo colony into French and British Mandated Spheres, and traces
Franco-British economie policies that contributed to the defeat of Togolese reunification at-
tempts.
Togoland was divided by the Togo mountains, which traversed the colony from southwest
to northeast. Togoland was bounded to the west by the Asante (Ashanti), kingdom, and to
the east by the kingdom of Dahomey. The north and south had relatively large populations,
whereas the centre was sparsely inhabited. The north contained a variety of ethnic groups.
The Islamic principalities of Sokodé and Mango were part of a long-distance trading network.
Caravans carried kola nuts from Ashanti to Hausaland in northern Nigeria. This traffic also
benefïtted northern Togoland through the sale of iron, rubber, and food commodities. The
south had a predominantly homogeneous Ewe ethnic population. In fact, however, the Ewe
consisted of a collection of sub-groups which had settled the region, i.e., the area which later
became southern German Togo, plus the extreme southeast of the British Gold Coast (known
as the Volta triangle) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Despite some obvious differences, this Ewe-region shared common historical, cultural, and
linguistic characteristics. Ewe civilization was strongly influenced by Ashanti and Dahomey
and by early contact with European traders and missionaries. The latter devised a uniform
orthography of the Ewe language on the eve of German colonization. Some Ewe sub-groups
had stronger political organizations than others, but a centralized Ewe-state never existed.-3
In the nineteenth Century, production and export of palm oil replaced the slave trade in the
south. Economie relations between north and south were limited to only two caravan trails,
which connected Lomé-Kete-Krachi and Aného-Sokodé via Atakpamé.
When Gennan trading companies feit threatened by local taxes and French expansion, the
Second Empire proclaimed a protectorate in the coastal zone of Togo. Subsequent German
penetration aimed at reaching Kete-Krachi and Atakpamé in order to profil from the caravan
trade in the interior. During German colonization, production of export crops grown by
African peasants, particularly palm oil, palm kernels, cotton, cocoa, and rubber, rose
considerably. Gennan administrators improved the caravan trails to stimulate trade and
production. The construction of a jetty made Lomé an important port. The widening of
main roads and the building of feeder road Systems developed especially in the south, speeded
traffic, and decreased transportation costs. To facilitate control of the north, the Germans
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extended the main roads from Lomé, via Kete-JCrachi and Sokodé to Mango.5 Subse-
quentiy, forced labourers from Kara and Mango6 constructed railroad Unes that connected
Lomé with Aného, Kpalimé, and Atakpamé.
By the time German colonization ended, thousands of seasonal labourers had been migrat-
ing annually from southern Togo to the export production areas in the Gold Coast.7
German colonization forced a new type of economie Integration upon Togoland. The
northern region's precolonial east-west orientation shifted southward. As a result, a large
part of the south become firmly integrated into the global market, and a regularized labour
migration pattern developed.
Until the global depression of the 1930s, export production m French and British Togo rose
considerably. In French Togo, cocoa and coffee production increased considerably, but
stagnated thereafter until 1945. After 1929, economie development in British Togoland
decelerated, but its share in the Gold Coast cocoa export rose from 0.2% in 1929 to 4% in
1938. Northern French and British Togo remained sources of seasonal labour supply to the
south. After 1920, a few thousand labourers migrated annually from northern French Togo
and the area 'around Kpalimé to cocoa-producing areas in British Togoland and the Gold
Coast. In fact, out-migration exceeded internal migration in French Togo, because the emi-
grants were attracted by higher earnings in the cocoa fields, but they also fled high taxation
in French Togo. Apart from some 14,000 forced labourers from the north the French used
to construct the Atakpamé-Blitta railroad line, labour migration suddenly ended in 1929, be-
cause the economie crisis forced curtailment of the cocoa production. Between 1929 and
1933, cocoa workers returaed from the Gold Coast and British Togoland to their homesteads
in French Togo. After 1932, only a few hundred labourers migrated annually to British
Togoland and the Gold Coast.
The postwar partition of Togoland necessitated a major reorientation in the region's
infrastructure and transportation System. Some roads disappeared entirely, and others be-
came relatively unimportant. French Togo improved the roads connecting Sokodé and
Mango in order to tighten control of the north without having to depend on the roads in
British Togoland. The French also constructed feeder road Systems to facilitate their control
of densely populated areas, such as Kara and Dapaong, and to expedite the transportation
of export production. The post-1929 economie crisis reduced infrastructural development in
French Togo almost entirely until 1945. The British, on the other hand, sought the rapid
economie integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. In 1922, they constructed a
road from Accra to Togoland and crossed the Volta River by ferry. In 1930, the admin-
istration connected the cocoa-producing areas of British Togoland with Kumasi, Accra, and
other coastal towns. Next, the British expanded the feeder road network within the cocoa
area, and at the same time they created a new cocoa frontier east of Kete-Krachi. The
northern part of British Togoland remained almost totally neglected, with the sole exception
of the road to Yendi that was improved. The colonial administration made no efforts to im-
prove communication links between British Togoland and French Togo.10
As a result of this neglect that reversed prewar German policy, economie relations between
French Togo and British Togoland languished. During the German era, Kpalimé had been
the "natural" collection centre of Togolese cocoa production. From there, the cocoa was
transported to Lomé. Between 1929 and 1938, the volume of cocoa from British Togoland
transported to Kpalimé experienced little change, but the proportion in terms of total pro-
duction shrank from 90% in 1929 to only 35% in 1938. The bulk of British cocoa production
was transported via new roads to the Gold Coast.''
Increasing demands for raw materials after World War II stimulated export production in
French Togo and British Togoland. Both administrations made large Investments in agri-
culture. In this respect, British Togoland lagged behind France, and made a late start in the
mid-1950s. At the time, the administration wanted to compensate for the relative economie
neglect of British Togoland after 1940. Both administrations expended large sums on im-
provmg the infrastructure of their mandated territones. French Togo improved the mam
roads and expanded the network of feeder roads. British Togoland also improved the quahty
of the roads in the south, and constructed a bridge across the Volta River to replace the ferry.
Only two new roads crossed the partition line. The northern link soon lost its importance.
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Increased labour migration accompanied revived export production in British Togoland.
After 1950, labour migration from north to south resumed in French Togo, but by the end
of the colonial era, about 10,000 labourers migrated to the Gold Coast and British Togoland
from French Togo annually13 to swell the thousands of labour migrants who moved to
British Togoland and the Gold Coast between 1940 and 1945.M After 1945, British
Togoland also turned more and more into an out-migration area, because new cocoa areas
opened up to the west, and because of the increasing attractiveness of Accra as a labour mar-
ket.15 In the early postwar period, economie integration of the two Togos appeared
impracticable. The only common denominator connecting the two colonies was the cross-
border transportation of cocoa.
British Togoland became part of the new Republic of Ghana in 1957. A cocoa tree blight
and low prices set by the Cocoa Marketing Board reduced production. Investments in the
region's infrastructure languished. Only one hardtop road, from Accra via Ho to Jasikan,
remained operational.
In French Togo, however, economie development accelerated after independence in 1960.
Regional development corporations and new state organizations promoted coffee, cocoa,
cotton, and palm oil production. Even so, in the late 1960s, phosphates discovered near the
coast replaced agricultural products as the most important export item. Simultaneously,
various industries come into Operation in Lomé. After 1966, the government launched an
ambitious road improvement programme. By 1980, an excellent road network penetrated all
the way to the country's northern and southern borders. Two new railway lines in the south
further improved the transportation infrastructure.
Communications links between the two former Togos suffered neglect. Some cocoa still
flowed from former British Togoland to the Republic of Togo, especially from the late 1960s
until 1971, the peak year. Generally, the traffic remained below the modest levels achieved in
the 1930s.16 This decline was partly due to stricter border controls and occasional border
closures. Economie Stagnation in Ghana and prosperity in the Republic of Togo kept
Togolese migrant labourers in their own country. Migration to Ghana decreased to between
one and two-thousand migrant workers annually. They were attracted by jobs in Accra and
in the newer cocoa fields to the west. In an attempt to overcome its economie problems,
Ghana's government expelled 81,500 Togolese in 1969-1970. Thereafter, labour migration to
Ghana shrank to only a few hundred workers annually. In the post-colonial period, eco-
nomie relations between both parts of the former German Togo colony became marginal.
The German colonizers of Togo had made efforts to consolidate and unify the region by
improving the entire area's administrative and transportation infrastructure. Under the
French and British rule the divided Togos suffered the effects of sporadic, haphazard, and
poorly coordinated economie contacts. After independence, connections between the two
former colonies languished, and at times ceased altogether. These disruptive tendencies had
a negative impact on indigenous political unification efforts.
The French and British colonial administrations discouraged political Opposition by
Africans. Initially, however, Africans' concerns centred on economie issues, and desires for
ethnic unification had commercial overtones. In 1920, some African traders in Lomé feared
being cut off from an important part of their trading area then under British control. They
petitioned the British government to reunify both Togos under British rule. In the long-run
their fears proved justified.
Shortly after World War I, some petitioners had demanded the unification of all Ewes who
were scattered over the Gold Coast, British Togoland, and French Togo.18 The
complainants consisted of the rising Ewe elite, whose members resided in the economically
most developed regions, and were the most Europeanized and best educated Africans in both
Togos. They had experienced the efficiënt and progressive German colonization efforts,
during which time an Ewe Presbyterian Church came into being. Under German rule, the
Ewes had experienced a status that had the semblance of unification of all the Ewes in a um-
fied Togo colony. During the worst years of the economie crisis in the early 1930s, some of
the Ewes demanded the restoration of German colonization. A small group of German-
educated civil servants, their careers blocked by insufficient knowledge of English and French,
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had fbrmed the "Deutscher Togobund." The Permanent Mandates Commission of the
League of Nations ignored their request.19
The influence of economie relations on the Togolese reunification movement became evi-
dent during World War II. The British administration hermetically sealed the border between
British and French Togo because the French administration supported the Vichy govern-
ment. The cessation of Anglo-French economie and social contacts particularly affected the
south. In 1943, members of the Ewe elite urged the British government in vain to unite all
Ewes. In 1946, Ewes from French Togo, British Togoland, and the Volta triangle held a
convention at Accra, followed shortly thereafter by the founding of the All-Ewe Conference
by Daniel Chapman, an Ewe from the Volta triangle. This meeting boosted the reunification
cause considerably.
Hereafter, Ewe leaders succeeded in placing their unification cause on the international
agenda by means of a well-organized campaign, fund raising, and dispatching petitions and
representatives to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. In 1946, the Comité d'Unité
Togolaise, led by Sylvanus Olympio, won the elections in French Togo. One year later,
Olympio pleaded the cause of reunification at the United Nations in New York. As a result
of this appeal, the first United Nations Visiting Mission investigated the "Ewe-question" on
the spot. In all, three Visiting Missions21 examined the socioeconomic Situation and
sounded populär sentiments in both Togos. The Missions held meetings with the local
populations, which themselves had a politicizing effect. Ewe nationalists utilized the politica!
rights spelled out in the Trusteeship Agreements to express their views. Gradually, the
movement shifted from unifying the Ewe people to reunification of Togo. The politica! elites
were driven by political pragmatism, notably the opportunities offered by the two colonies'
Trusteeship status, and to a lesser degree by economie considerations.
Other factors spurred desires for unification as well. Ewe representatives from Ho feared
the domination of better-educated Ewe leaders from the Volta triangle, who dominated the
All-Ewe Conference. These were more inclined to support independence of British Togoland
together with the Gold Coast as a first step towards reunification of all Ewes. Buem, a
cocoa-growing area of recent vintage around Kete-Krachi, was populated predominantly by
non-Ewes, who feared being overruled by the Ewes. At the 1949 All-Ewe Conferences in Ho,
and Kpalimé in 1951, these contradictions became clear and the All-Ewe Conference did not
survive them.
Hereafter, Ewe solidarity disintegrated. Some leaders, such as Champman, joined Kwame
Nknimah's independence movement, the Convention People's Party, and others founded the
Togoland Congress.22 In the 1951, 1954, and 1956 Togolese elections the Togoland Con-
gress defeated the Convention People's Party in southern British Togoland. The Convention
People's Party also succumbed in the cocoa-growing areas of the Gold Coast, because farmers
held the CPP government responsible for the low cocoa prices paid by the Cocoa Marketing
Board. The Togoland Congress failed to gain any support in northern British Togoland,
where the people favoured the Northern People's Party. This party also represented the
northern Gold Coast's ethnic groups, with which the northern British Togolese were allied.
In French Togo the Comité d'Unité Togolaise initially advocated unification of the Ewes,
then switched to Togo reunification. This shift could not prevent its defeat in the 1952
elections by a combined north-south Opposition led by Nicolas Grunitzky.-3
The third United Nations Visiting Mission in 1955 had to find a solution for the future of
British Togoland, because the British government planned to grant independence to the Gold
Coast without proposing to continue its trusteeship over British Togoland. The Mission was
well aware of the different attitudes in northern and southern British Togoland on the ques-
tion of reunification. The Commission recommended separate plebiscites for north and
south, a plan which the United Nations ignored. In 1956, one plebiscite was held throughout
British Togoland.-4 In the campaign preceding the plebiscite the Togoland Congress sup-
ported Separation from the Gold Coast, whereas the Convention People's Party strongly
opposed "Separation" on the grounds that British Togoland was economically vital to the
Gold Coast. British Togoland produced one-tenth of the country's cocoa exports and had
just been drawn into an ambitious and expensive project. The scheme involved the con-
struction of a large dam on the Volta River that would generale hydro-electricity in order to
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facilitate industrialization, mainly on the Gold Coast. The Convention People's Party tried
to influence the outcome of the plebiscite by accelerating investments in British Togoland's
agriculture and infrastructure. The (anti-Convention People's Party) also opposed reparation
Northern People's Party also opposed "Separation." °
The voting pattern showed large differences between north and south. In the three northern
districts, 84%, 81%, and 79% of the electorale rejected "Separation." In the cocoa-growing
district of Buem-Krachi 60% of the people opposed "Separation." Only the two
southernmost districts of Kpandu and Ho supported the cause of Togo-reunification. In
these two districts only 34% and 28% of the voters opposed "Separation."27 Throughout
British Togoland, 58% of the voters opposed "Separation" from the Gold Coast. As a result,
British Togoland merged with the Gold Coast, and became part of the independent Republic
of Ghana the next year.
The Third Visiting Mission, the plebiscite, and the unification of British Togoland with the
Gold Coast radicalized public opinion in French Togo. In the 1958 elections the Grunitzky
goverament, which had been advocating Togolese autonomy within the French Union since
1956, suffered defeat by the Comité d'Unité Togolaise, which demanded independence. Two
years later, French Togo became the independent Republic of Togo.
Until shortly after World War II, Ewe nationalism was stimulated by the Trusteeship status
that split the Ewes ethnically, but was drawn by the same status into an approach that fa-
voured territorial Togolese unity. The influence of economie conditions on reunification is
difficult to analyze because the United Nations failed to organize an integral plebiscite in both
Togos. It is clear, however, that northern British Togoland opposed reunification because
contacts with French Togo were almost totally lacking. Voting behaviour in the cocoa-
growing districts was preponderantly ethnically oriented. Only this can explain the difference
in voters' choices between Buem-Krachi on the one hand and Ho and Kpandu on the other
hand.
Apparently, the weakening of economie links between both Togos ensured that political re-
unification could not be forthcoming, despite evidences of Ewe ethnic solidarity. This does
not mean, however, that voters in the cocoa-growing areas lacked other than ethnic reasons
to support reunification. Discontent with Gold Coast cocoa price policy stimulated support
for Togolese reunification, but the lack of economie Integration between British and French
Togo weakened Ewe resolve to support territorial and ethnic unification in sufficient numbers
to warrant a successful resolution of Ewe consolidation into a single political unit.
A few months before Ghana's independence, the authorities discovered three military camps
in southern British Togoland. The Nkrumah administration nipped the revolt in the bud and
arrested the Togoland Congress leadership. In 1958, Nkrumah exacerbated the poor re-
lations with the newly-elected Comité d'Unité Togolaise government. He declared that
French Togo must become the seventh region of Ghana. At the time, the Comité d'Unité
Togolaise desired a federation with Ghana.29 In 1960, Ghana's government again.discov-
ered a secessionist plot in former British Togoland. Some of its leaders fled to the Republic
of Togo. Thereafter, mutual relations deteriorated, and Ghana frequently closed its borders
with Togo. With the rise of new political leaders in both countries relations improved.
But reunification desires among the Ewe kept on smouldering. At the 1969 and 1971 Pan-
Ewe Festivals in Notsé, and in Ho in 1970, revived Ewe nationalism became noticeable. In
1972, Ewe nationalists founded the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland
(TOLIMO). This organization disputed the validity of the 1956 plebiscite, and proclaimed its
desire to amalgamate former British Togoland with the Republic of Togo. The Eyadéma
administration of the Republic of Togo, which came into power in 1967, supported
TOLIMO. The leadership of Eyadéma, a Kabyè from the Kara area in the north, meant an
important shift in the political balance of power from southern (Ewe) to northern politicians
in the Republic of Togo.-" Championing TOLIMO ensured Eyadéma the support of the
Ewes,
Throughout the 1970s, TOLIMO was active. but its actions were limited to mounting
demonstrations and presenting petitions in the Republic of Togo and in Ghana. They
aroused no interest in the international Community. - TOLIMO found scanty support in
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the Volta triangle, and in other areas it failed to become a mass movement. In Ghana, the
govermnent suppressed TOLIMO. After 1978, TOLIMO disintegrated, thanks to its sup-
pression and lack of qualified leadership.33 The support TOLIMO received in Ghana was
due to Ghana's political instability and economie decay, which contrasted unfavourably with
the Situation in Togo.
This essay has analyzed the influence of economie Integration in German, French, and
Bntish Togo on Ewe nationalism and reunification attempts of both parts of the former
German colony. During Gennan colonization, the south became incorporated into the global
export market as a production area and the north mainly as a source of labour supply. These
economie functions remained unchanged under the French and British, but the economie
Integration of the two regions begun in the German period first came to a premature halt,
then altered direction. British Togoland became progressively integrated into the Gold Coast
economie orbit, in defiance of prevailing infrastructural and transportation facilities. and
even in the face of prevailing labour migration patterns. Franco-British relations in these re-
spects became increasingly weaker. A high economie Integration level of both Togos could
therefore not have been the reason for the desire of Ewes to reunite both parts politically. On
the contrary; at first, the reunification movement was based on ethnic ties, although economie
considerations, such as discontent with low cocoa prices and border closures, strongly rein-
forced reunification sentiments. But in fact it was the lack of economie Integration of both
Togos, owing to separate colonizations after 1920, that prevented the Ewe political movement
from gaining more support for reunification. The pragmatic path that the reunification
movement chose after 1951 to reunify both Togos instead of all Ewes lacked suffïcient voters'
appeal in the north. The lack of economie Integration, therefore, must be added to the pres-
ence of different official languages and educational Systems and physical difficulties of main-
taining clan and family ties across borders 34 as a major contributing cause for the
weakening of relations between both Togos.
Colonial powers often drew African and Asian borders irrespective of ethnic and political
entities or historical claims. This policy split homogeneous communities and combined
different, often hostile, ethnicities in one colony. The Ewes suffered just such an experience.
With the rise of political awakening in the colonies, contradictory trends often emerged. One
was to assume political power in the divided colonized territory, the other to restore precol-
onial entities. After independence, these contradictory objectives at times resulted in border
conflicts among the new states and in the birth of Separation movements within them.
The former German Togo colony is an exceptional case insofar as reunification attempts are
concerned. The Ewes rejected restoration of the precolonial entity, but chose a later colonial
determination. This example demonstrates the power of colonial administrations and the
independent governments succeeding them to counterbalance the efforts of unification
movements by means of obstructing economie Integration. The partition of the German
Togo colony into French and British Mandated Spheres at the end of World War I consti-
tuted the first phase in the disruption of unificalion along ethnic Unes. The divergent
Franco-British economie policies in Togoland in the interwar period introduced -the second
phase in nullifying ethnic unity trends in the region. These efforts ensured that Togolese re-
unification attempts in the ethnic sense would prove abortive.
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